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Luigi Cannari* and Giovanni D’Alessio* 
1. Introduction 
In the economic literature there is a broad agreement that intergenerational 
transfers play an important role in the accumulation of household wealth. In fact, 
households modify their own wealth mainly by saving or dissaving, as described by the 
life-cycle theory, and by receiving or giving gifts and bequests.1  
Understanding the role of intergenerational transfers in the creation of household 
wealth is important in many respects. Households who receive or expect to receive, give 
or plan to give transfers may change their consumption and savings, and their efforts in 
producing income. Thus, the presence of significant bequests might have important 
consequences for policy, depending on the reasons people bequeath part or all of their 
wealth. Furthermore, if inheritance is a way to transmit to future generations the 
ownership of productive capital and the control over it, it becomes a crucial factor in the 
efficient allocation of capital. In addition, inheritance poses a problem in terms of 
equality: if household wealth were primarily determined by inheritance, there would be 
little room for an individual to reach higher wealth classes through his/her own merits and 
efforts.  
In this paper we measure the importance of transfers in household wealth 
accumulation, estimating the share of current wealth and total lifetime resources 
attributable to bequests and gifts, using different methods of estimation.2 We then explore 
how transfers are distributed among the population and look at their correlation with other 
variables (in particular wealth and lifetime resources). Data on intergenerational transfers 
are mainly drawn from special sections of the 1991 and 2002 questionnaire of the Bank of 
Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth.  
2. Measuring the importance of intergenerational transfers 
The theoretical literature has emphasised three main motives for bequests. The 
most prominent attention has been given to the altruistic model (Becker, 1981), for which 
the main motive for intergenerational transfers is that parents care for their heirs. In 
Becker’s view, bequests may assume the form of both human capital and financial 
transfers: as the human capital investments have a declining rate of return, financial 
transfers take place only when the returns to human capital investments fall below the 
interest rate. This implies that financial bequest concerns mainly the richest households. 
                                                          
*  Bank of Italy. We are grateful to Massimo Omiccioli and Luigi Federico Signorini for their comments on a preliminary 
version of the paper.  
1  A further source of wealth variations, less investigated in the economic literature, is capital gains (see Cannari, 
D’Alessio and Gambacorta, 2006).  
2  The seminal paper by Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) spawned a large debate on the measure of the contribution of 
intergenerational transfers to household wealth. The discussion has involved both methodological issues, i.e. the 
capitalisation of returns of past transfers, and the magnitude of the share of wealth due to inheritance, which can vary 
between 20 and 80 per cent (Kotlikoff and Summers, 1981; Modigliani, 1988; Kessler and Masson, 1989) depending 
on the method of estimation. More recently the debate has extended to the distribution of transfers and their impact on 
wealth inequality. For recent contributions see Christelis and Weber (2007), Cox and Stark (2005), De Nardi (2004), 
Gokhale et al. (2001) Gokhale and Kotlikoff (2002), Hurd and Smith (2002), and Kopczuk and Lupton (2005). 
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Some other authors (Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers, 1985; Cox, 1987) have 
emphasised the strategic behaviour of parents who may use the promise of future 
bequests to induce their children to provide them with assistance in old age. In this view, 
the bequest is simply an exchange, where the bequests of the parents correspond to 
services (i.e. nursing, companionship) provided by the children. A final motive for 
bequest is related to uncertainty about the length of life. As parents may accumulate 
assets for their future needs and for precautionary motives, an early death determines an 
unintentional bequest (Yaari, 1965). Whatever the motive for bequest is, intergenerational 
transfers have an impact on the distribution of household wealth. 
The importance of intergenerational transfers in the process of wealth accumulation 
can be measured by the share of wealth that derives from bequests and gifts. This share 
can be computed by different methods, relying on different assumptions, with their own 
merits and shortcomings. 
Let TRt be transfers (bequests and gifts) received at time t, TGt transfers (gifts) 
given at time t, Yt income, Ct consumption, and r the rate of return on wealth Wt. Then the 
accumulation of wealth can be described by the following equation: 
Wt+1 =Wt (1+r) + Yt - Ct+ TRt - TGt     (1) 
As saving St is equal to Yt - Ct, the current value of Wt can be expressed as: 
Wt = Σi=1, …, t-1 (1+r)t-i-1 Si + Σi=1, …, t-1 (1+r)t-i-1 TRi - Σi=1, …, t-1 (1+r)t-i-1 TGi = 
= WtL+ WtR - WtG           (2) 
where WtL represents the life-cycle portion of wealth, WtR the cumulative value of 
received bequests and gifts and WtG the cumulative value of transfers already given to 
offspring.  
The debate on the relative importance of savings and bequests in accumulation of 
wealth is based on decomposition (2). Some authors have concentrated on the ratio λt = 
WtL/Wt, expressing the share of wealth attributable to past saving; others have analysed 
the ratio αtR = WtR/Wt, measuring the importance of bequests. Although the index αtR is 
not the mere complement to 1 of λt, it should be close to that when computed on the 
living population, as the term WtG measures inter-vivos transfers only, which represent a 
very small part of intergenerational transfers. 
This ratio αtR, proposed by Kotlikoff and Summers (1981), has been criticised by 
Modigliani (1988) for two main reasons: first, because saving is usually defined as 
disposable income (including interest income) minus consumption, while in equation (2) 
interest income on bequests is included in the cumulative value of intergenerational 
transfers; second, because representation (2) implicitly assumes that the life-cycle profile 
of consumption is not affected by intergenerational transfers. Admittedly, this is a rather 
strong assumption; for instance, if the recipient consumed not only the return on bequests 
but even part of the bequests, then the ratio could be greater than one.  
Assuming a different perspective, an index of the role in wealth assumed by 
intergenerational transfers could be derived by analysing its destination rather than its 
origin, on the base of the following equation: 
Wt + WtR* = WtG* - St*        (3) 
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where WtR* and WtG* represent the transfers respectively to be received and to be given in 
the future and S*t is the cumulative amount of future net saving. The equation represents 
the relationship between the net wealth plus the expected transfers to be received in terms 
of possible destinations, respectively future transfers to descendants and future dissaving.  
The index can thus be defined as: 
αtG = (WtG* – WtR*) / Wt = 1 – (-S*t )/ Wt     (4) 
and represent the complement to 1 of the ratio of future dissaving to net wealth. The more 
the intergenerational transfers are important in terms of destination of present net wealth, 
the closer the index is to 1. 
Indexes αtR and αtG, measured on the same population, provide different estimates 
as they reveal different aspects of the phenomenon: αtR looks at the past, αtG at the future. 
These estimates may differ because the counterparts of recipients and donors in a given 
population are not necessarily included in the same population: the donors of those who 
have received a transfer can be dead, while the recipients of those who plan to give a 
transfer may not be born yet. On a more practical level, the estimate of αtR is based on a 
recall of past transfers, which may suffer from some kind of bias, while that of αtG is 
based on expectations, which have their own measurement problems. Nonetheless, we 
believe that the comparison between the two indexes can help to shed light on the 
importance that households assign to future transfers. The relevance of this view is plain, 
as the bequest motive is a well-known factor influencing the saving behaviour of 
households. 
A serious problem of these measures comes from the relationship between wealth, 
transfers and age. The ratio αtR is computed by averaging wealth and transfers over the 
whole population; thus it will depend on the population structure: in a population mainly 
made up of elderly people, for instance, many of them will have already received 
bequests from their parents and the numerator will be greater than in a young population, 
whose members have not yet received bequests. Analogous considerations hold for the 
index αtG when the expected transfers are taken into account.  
The denominator will depend on the average age of the population too: it will be 
lower in a young population, whose members have not had the time to accumulate wealth 
and have not yet received bequests; it will be greater when the average age is near to 
retirement; it will decrease in an elderly population, whose members have already 
consumed part of their life-cycle wealth and transferred assets to their offspring.  
Similarly, the role of intergenerational transfers on wealth distribution could be 
incorrectly displayed by these measures as they depend on the age structure of the 
population and the intergenerational age gap. Let us consider the hypothetical situation of 
a population whose members earn the same income, have the same consumption 
expenditure and receive the same bequests at the same age, say t0. We would say that in 
this hypothetical world bequests do not contribute to wealth inequality. According to 
equation (5), on the contrary, we would find that bequests account for a large share of 
wealth inequality, because in any period there will be individuals (of age t> t0) who have 
already received bequests and individuals (of age t< t0) who have not yet received 
bequests. 
To overcome these shortcomings some changes have to be made in the above 
measures: a) the flow of inheritance should be considered in a lifetime persperctive; b) 
the amounts should be discounted at a fixed age. In this view, the analysis of 
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intergenerational transfers can be based on the relationship equating sources and 
destinations of lifetime resources:  
LY + LTR = LC + LTG        (7) 
where LTR =Σi=0, …,d (1+r)-i TRi ;  LY = Σi=0, …, d (1+r)-i Yi.  
LTG =Σi=0, …,d (1+r)-i TGi ;  LC = Σi=0, …, d (1+r)-i Ci.  
In a lifetime perspective, an index describing the role of intergenerational transfers 
analogous to the index αtR can be thus derived as: 
βR = LTR /( LTR + LY)        (8) 
In equation (7) bequests and income are discounted over the life span of each 
individual, ranging from 0 to d (the date of death). The ratio βR does not depend on the 
population structure; when looking at the impact of transfers on wealth inequality the 
ratio βR is therefore to be preferred to αtR, which depends on the average age of the 
population.  
An alternative index of the role of intergenerational transfers, analogous to the 
index αtG, may be derived analysing the destination of lifetime resources:  
βG = LTG /( LTG + LC) = LTG /( LTR + LY)     (9) 
βR and βG shed light on different aspects of wealth accumulation: while the index βR 
evaluates the transfers from the point of view of the recipients (those who receive gifts 
and bequests), βG assumes the point of view of the donors (those who intend to transfer 
wealth to their offspring); the latter indicator represents the intergenerational transfers (as 
a share of total resources) that individuals have already given or intend to give in the 
future to their children.  
The difference between these estimates can be useful to understand the importance 
of changes in the propensity to transfer wealth to heirs, once unintentional bequests and 
the demographic changes (and in particular the change in the number of children) have 
been taken into account. Both these measures are reported in the following sections. 
Moreover, from equation (7) it follows that the difference between the transfers 
given and those received in a lifetime corresponds to the cumulative lifetime savings. i.e. 
a sort of lifetime added wealth measure: 
LY - LC = LTG - LTR = LS       (10) 
This quantity may help in understanding the role that people assign to the well-
being of descendants. 
3. The Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth 
Our source of information is the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) 
conducted by the Bank of Italy yearly from 1965 to 1987 (except for 1985), every other 
year until 1995 and from 1998 on (the reference is to the year for which, not in which, the 
survey is conducted). The SHIW seeks to gather information on household 
microeconomic behaviour. The sample size is about 8,000 units per year. The basic 
survey unit is the “household”, defined as a group of individuals linked by ties of blood, 
marriage or affection, sharing the same dwelling and pooling all or part of their incomes. 
Institutional population is not included. Data are collected in personal interviews 
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conducted by professional interviewers. Participation is voluntary and not remunerated. 
As a result, the response rate is low, ranging in the last seven surveys between 33 per cent 
in 1991 and 58 in 1993. Further methodological details on the SHIW are given in Banca 
d’Italia (2002, 2004, 2006), Brandolini and Cannari (1994) and Brandolini (1999); on 
Italian wealth see also Cannari and D’Alessio (2006). 
Detailed data have been collected continuously on the social and demographic 
characteristics of household members and their incomes and, since 1980, on consumption 
expenditure. Estimates of households’ tangible assets are also available from the outset. 
Financial assets have been surveyed irregularly and dissatisfaction with the quality of the 
answers has led to frequent changes in the format of the questions: figures on a fairly 
comparable basis exist only from 1987 onwards. Raw data on tangible assets are collected 
on an individual basis and then aggregated by household, whereas financial assets are 
surveyed at the household level. 
This basic information on household wealth is complemented with two types of 
data on intergenerational transfers. In the surveys for 1991 and 2002 a special module 
was inserted in the questionnaire to ask household members the amount and timing of 
inheritances and gifts received from the previous generation (Banca d’Italia 1993 and 
2004). In the 2002 survey, in particular, household heads and their spouses/cohabitants 
were asked to indicate both the value of the transfers (bequests and gifts) made and 
received during the respondent’s lifetime and those that they expected to make or receive 
in the future.3 The detailed wording of the questions is reported in Appendix B.  
The second piece of information relates only to the dwellings owned by the 
household, but it has been asked on a continuous basis since 1987. Respondents have to 
specify how dwellings were acquired. Each individual property is identified as having 
been purchased, built to order by the household, inherited or received as a gift. In 
addition, respondents supply data on the year they became the owners. 
Both for 1991 and 2002 the two sources of information on inheritances have been 
merged, cross-checked and integrated; this explains why figures in this paper are higher 
than those based on the special modules alone.4 
As common in sample surveys, SHIW data also are affected by non-response, 
unwillingness to declare assets and the tendency to undervalue the declared asset 
holdings; these phenomena are typically correlated with household wealth. We refer the 
reader to Brandolini et al. (2004) for an extensive discussion of the relevance of such 
distortionary effects in the SHIW as well as for a detailed description of the adjustments 
adopted to correct for non-responses, non-reporting and under-reporting.  
We define household net worth as tangible assets (i.e. consumer durables, jewellery 
and other valuables, real estate and unincorporated businesses) plus financial assets 
(transaction and savings accounts, government bonds, equities and other assets) less 
financial liabilities (mortgages and other debts).  
                                                          
3  The SHIW is not the only source of information on intergenerational transfers in Italy. Information is also collected by 
the survey SHARE (see www.share-project.org and, for intergenerational transfers, Christelis and Weber, 2007), with 
questions similar to those used in the HRS (see Hurd and Smith, 2002). 
4  As the questions in the special modules on inheritance were asked after information had been provided on houses 
owned (How did the household acquire ownership?), sometimes the respondents did not report the same information, 
even though it was required. Where information on inherited houses was found and the household did not report any 
transfer, a record was added. In cases where both inherited houses and transfers were found, a conservative strategy 
was applied, adding information on transfers only when the amount or the year of the transfer were very different. 
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4. Traditional measures of the role of intergenerational transfers 
4.1 Direct evidence from the 1991 and 2002 SHIW 
In 1991 about 26 per cent of households declared they had received transfers for an 
average amount of 41,704 euros at 2002 prices (Table 1). The share of intergenerational 
transfers in net worth was 30.9 per cent (25.2 from inheritances and 5.7 from gifts). 
Assuming a real interest rate of 2 per cent per year and adjusting for the income stream 
produced by transferred assets, the amount would rise to 66,017 euros at 2002 prices and 
the share to 48.9 per cent.5  
Table 1 
Intergenerational received transfers, 1991 and 2002 
(euros) 
 1991 2002 
 Average (*) Ratio to net wealth Average 
Ratio to net 
wealth (**) 
All households     
Without capitalisation     
Inheritance ................................. 34,057 25.2 51,485 28.7 
Gift............................................. 7,647 5.7 8,937 5.0 
Total received transfers ............. 41,704 30.9 60,422 33.6 
With capitalisation     
Inheritance ................................. 53,044 39.3 85,489 47.6 
Gift............................................. 12,972 9.6 13,217 7.4 
Total received transfers ............. 66,017 48.9 98,706 54.9 
Net wealth 135,041 100.0 179,649 100.0 
Recipient households     
Received transfers ..................... 163,057 83.3 178,785 63.3 
Capitalised received transfers .... 258,114 131.9 292,067 103.4 
Net wealth.................................. 195,696 100.0 282,400 100.0 
Non-recipient households     
Received transfers...................... 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Capitalised received transfers .... 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Net wealth.................................. 114,196 100.0 127,196 100.0 
Net wealth of recipients minus net 
wealth of non-recipients................... 81,500 - 155,204 - 
 (*) Amounts for 1991 are expressed at 2002 prices.  
(**) Net wealth for 2002 is the estimate obtained on the random sub-sample of those to whom the special 
module on intergenerational transfers was submitted.  
Source: Our calculations based on data from the SHIW.  
                                                          
5  In the United States, in the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances 20.7 per cent of households reported they had received 
wealth transfers. The present value of all inheritances received up to 1992 and accumulated at a real interest rate of 3 
per cent amounted to 25.8 per cent of household net worth (Wolff, 2002, p. 261; see also Brown and Weisbenner, 
2002). 
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In the 2002 survey the share of households who declared they had received 
transfers is higher than that observed in 1991 (33.8 compared with 26 per cent). The 
average amounts of the total received transfers are about 45 per cent higher than those 
observed in 1991; the share in terms of net wealth, however, is only 2.7 percentage points 
higher (33.6 compared with 30.9 per cent), as wealth too has grown rapidly (33 per cent).6 
Adjusting for the income stream produced by transferred assets (using the same interest 
rate of 2 per cent per year as above), the amount would rise to 98,706 euros while the 
share to net wealth would increase to 54.9 per cent, compared with 48.9 per cent in 1991.  
Both in 1991 and 2002, households receiving transfers turned out to be on average 
richer than those reporting no transfers. If the income stream produced by transferred 
assets is taken into account, the average wealth of recipients is lower than the received 
transfers, implying a negative impact of bequests on the saving behaviour of the heirs.  
The 2002 survey collected information not only on received transfers but also on 
transfers given to the offspring. The latter does not include bequests, but only inter-vivos 
transfers. The share of households that have already given transfers is smaller than the 
share of households that have already received transfers (3.6 compared to 33.8 per cent; 
see Table A1 in Appendix); the average size of given transfers, adjusted for the income 
stream, is small (4,690 euros) compared with received bequests.  
The age profiles of total wealth, life-cycle wealth (computed according to equation 
(2), with capitalisation of returns) and transfers are shown in Table A2 and Figure 1. Both 
kinds of transfers (received and given) increase with age; net wealth reaches its maximum 
in the age class 51-60 years (near retirement age) and declines thereafter; the decline in 
life-cycle wealth is steeper and the amount of life-cycle wealth becomes close to zero 
over 71 years.7 
Looking at the destination of wealth, the share of households who plan to leave an 
inheritance is far greater than that of those who expect to receive one (58.6 compared 
with 12.6 per cent; Table A1 in Appendix). The discrepancy is even greater when 
computed on the amounts, as the average inheritance that households plan to leave to 
their descendants (about 130,000 euros) is approximately 8 times the corresponding 
amount of transfers households expect to receive in the future (about 16,000 euros). Once 
the amounts are considered at present value, i.e. discounted at a 2 per cent rate of interest, 
the gap decreases but remains high (77,012 versus 12,459 euros). This result may be due 
to the average age of household heads (55 years in the sample). At age of 50, many 
households will have already received bequests and the amount to be received will be 
small compared with what they plan to leave. In addition, the discrepancy may depend on 
uncertainty about the expenditures that will be necessary in the final years of life 
(healthcare or surgery); this expenditure could be disregarded by the donors (as not 
depending on his/her will) or overestimated by the potential recipients (see, for instance, 
Brown and Weisbenner, 2002). 
The age profile of the amounts (at present value) shows that the transfers 
households expect to receive decrease with age while the transfers households expect to 
leave, like the wealth curve, reach a maximum (about 150,000 euros) in the age group 51-
60 years (Figure 2). 
                                                          
6  Between 1991 and 2002 real capital gains contributed approximately 40 per cent to the growth of household wealth 
(Cannari, D’Alessio, Gambacorta, 2006). 
7  The age profiles, estimated on the basis of a cross-section survey, can be affected by spurious cohort effects. In Italy, 
the net wealth profile observed in the past decades is similar to that shown in Figure 1, although the most recent years 
are characterised by lower values for young people and higher values for the elderly.  
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Figure 1 
Household net wealth by origin, 2002 
(thousands euros) 
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Source: Our calculations based on data from the SHIW. Transfers include the capitalisation of interest. 
On average, future dissaving is equal to 64.1 per cent of net wealth; the αtG index, 
which represents a measure of how important future transfers are for households, is thus 
equal to its complement to 1, i.e. 35.9 per cent, lower then the corresponding index αR 
(54.9 per cent). The age profile of the future net dissaving tends to increase until 
retirement age and to decrease thereafter, when wealth is decumulated. 
To sum up, these results show that a large share (54.9 per cent) of net wealth is 
attributable to intergenerational transfers and that households plan to give their offspring 
a smaller share of wealth (35.9 per cent) than they have received. This result, however, 
has to be taken cautiously for three main reasons: 1) transfers that households plan to give 
to their children do not include unintentional bequests; on the contrary, unintentional 
bequests are included in received transfers; 2) in many cases (in particular for dwellings) 
the interviewees did not remember the value of received transfers at the time they 
received them and provided the interviewers with the value of assets at the time of the 
interview; thus, the value of received transfers includes the capital gains occurred in the 
period. On the contrary, the value of transfers to be given does not include, by definition, 
future capital gains; 3) although the interviewees were requested to provide their best 
estimate of planned transfers, taking into consideration actual and future children, it was 
very difficult for young couples (especially those without children) to provide an answer.  
In addition, the lower amount of given bequests compared with received ones 
depends on the capitalisation of interest and demographic changes. If we look at the non-
capitalised average amounts per household, transfers received over the whole life span are 
smaller than transfers given over the life span. This difference increases in per capita 
terms, i.e. taking into consideration the decline in the number of children.8  
                                                          
8  In Italy the total fertility rate (number of children per woman) has declined from 2.7 in 1965 to 1.32 in 2005. This rate 
is among the lowest in the European Union: only Spain and Greece show fertility rates lower than Italy’s. 
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Figure 2 
Household net wealth by destination, 2002 
(thousands euros) 
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Source: Our calculations based on data from the SHIW. Transfers include the capitalisation of interest. 
4.2 The estimate of inherited wealth based on houses 
A further estimate can be obtained, for real estate only, using the method proposed 
by Barca, Cannari and Guiso (1994). The SHIW collects data on the way houses were 
acquired. Each individual property is identified as having been purchased, built to order 
by the household, inherited or received as a gift. In addition, respondents supply data on 
the year they became the owners, making it possible to calculate the capitalisation of the 
returns on bequests. The value of wealth inherited in the form of real estate is given by:  
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t Ep
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where Ek is the value of the inherited dwelling at time k. The probability p of an 
inherited property being sold is estimated at 0.92 per cent on an annual basis. The gross 
rate of return used for capitalisation (based on survey data) is equal to 2 per cent (net of 
depreciation).  
The share of intergenerational transfers (bequests plus gifts) on total net wealth, 
without capitalisation, ranges from 23.6 in 1991 to 34.9 per cent in 2004. Adjusting for 
capitalisation the estimates become 34.4 and 56 per cent respectively (Table 2). The 
estimates for 1991 and 2002 are similar to those derived from the direct evidence above. 
While basic estimates are very similar to those of Barca, Cannari and Guiso (1994), 
the estimates correcting for the probability of sale and for capitalisation are a little 
greater. The discrepancies are mainly due to the length of the period between the date of 
the survey and the year in which households acquired the property, which is longer in the 
most recent waves.  
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On the basis of these figures, we again conclude that bequests play a significant 
role in the accumulation of wealth. In addition, this role turns out to have increased over 
the years (see Figure 3). 
Table 2  
Wealth in the form of real estate inherited or received as a gift in 1987-2004 
Total intergenerational transfers in the form of real estate 
Not 
correcting 
for 
probability 
of sale 
Correcting 
for 
probability 
of sale 
Correcting 
for 
probability 
of sale and 
capitalising
Not 
correcting 
for 
probability 
of sale 
Correcting 
for 
probability 
of sale 
Correcting 
for 
probability 
of sale and 
capitalising
 
Share of 
household 
who 
received a 
real estate 
transfer 
(euros at 2004 prices) (ratio to net worth)  
1987 ... 25.4 29,166 34,464 50,863 26.3 31.1 45.9 
1989 ... 23.6 26,948 31,442 45,478 21.4 25.0 36.2 
1991 ... 24.7 29,807 34,821 50,728 20.2 23.6 34.4 
1993 ... 26.4 37,850 44,827 65,782 22.2 26.2 38.5 
1995 ... 29.4 43,854 52,498 78,999 26.0 31.2 46.9 
1998 ... 28.7 44,404 53,664 83,008 24.5 29.7 45.9 
2000 ... 29.3 47,890 58,692 93,594 25.3 31.0 49.4 
2002 ... 28.7 49,542 60,357 96,088 25.3 30.8 49.1 
2004 ... 29.1 60,974 74,578 119,905 28.5 34.9 56.0 
Source: Our calculations based on data from the SHIW-HA. 
Figure 3 
Value of real estate inherited or received as a gift, 1987-2004 
(percentage ratio to net worth) 
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Source: Our calculations based on data from the SHIW-HA (Version 2.0, June 2006). 
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4.3 Evidence based on the flow-to-stock conversion method 
Survey estimates of inherited wealth may suffer from various biases due to careless 
recall or under-reporting. An alternative estimate of the role of inherited wealth can be 
obtained using data on the flows of inheritance observed in one year (Kotlikoff and 
Summers, 1981; Modigliani, 1988). For a growth rate of per capita output equal to n and 
an interest rate equal to r, assuming that interest is capitalised, the stock of inherited 
wealth is: 
)()1( )( nreBW gnre −−= −  
where B represents the yearly flow of bequests and g the age gap between parents and 
descendants.  
The flows of inheritance in one year can be estimated by applying the mortality 
rate (by sex and age) to the corresponding sample; the sum over all the sample of the 
product of the wealth held by each person – under the assumption that net worth is 
equally shared among parents – and the corresponding mortality rate can be interpreted as 
the mean value of the inheritances in that year.  
On the base of the estimated age gap between parents and offspring the shares of 
net wealth deriving from inheritances can be estimated under various hypotheses of 
constant yearly rates of growth and rates of returns.  
Table 3 
Inherited wealth estimates based on the flow-to-stock method 
Share of inherited to total wealth under various hypotheses (*) 
Year Flows/ net wealth 
Average gap (in 
years) between 
parents and 
offspring 
r-n=0% r-n=0.5% r-n=1% r-n=2% r-n=3% 
1989 .... 0.90 29.6 26.7 28.8 31.1 36.4 43.0 
1991 .... 1.04 29.9 31.1 33.6 36.3 42.6 50.4 
1993 .... 0.90 29.9 26.8 28.9 31.2 36.6 43.3 
1995 .... 0.98 29.9 29.3 31.6 34.1 40.1 47.4 
1998 .... 1.12 29.9 33.4 36.1 39.0 45.8 54.1 
2000 .... 1.35 30.0 40.4 43.5 47.1 55.3 65.4 
2002 .... 1.13 30.3 34.2 36.9 40.0 47.0 55.7 
2004 .... 1.12 30.5 34.0 36.7 39.8 46.8 55.6 
Source: Our calculations based on data from the SHIW. 
(*) n = yearly rate of growth; r = rate of return. The coefficients are supposed constant over time. In case 
n=r the share We = B g.  
 
Under all the hypotheses considered, the share of inheritances in wealth grows 
from 1989 to 2004, due to the growth of both the average gap and the estimated annual 
flows of inheritance (Table 3); the latter, in turn, reflects the better conditions of older 
people in more recent years compared with the early 19990s.9  
                                                          
9  Clearly, this measure does not account for gifts and other intergenerational transfers occurring before the death of the 
donor. On the other hand, the previous method could overestimate the amount of the flows, as no attention is paid to 
the negative correlation between wealth and mortality rate (Attanasio and Hoynes, 2000). 
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Following the above scheme, the role of intergenerational transfers in wealth 
accumulation decreases with income growth and increase with the increase in the returns 
on capital. In Italy, the rate of growth of income has been declining over the period 
analysed; as to capital returns, while real interest rates decreased significantly, capital 
gains both on shares and on dwellings largely sustained the returns on capital. All in all, it 
is likely that the slower growth in income and the increasing capital gains have 
contributed in amplifying the role of inheritances. 
4.4 The role of intergenerational transfers over the life span 
Estimates provided in the previous sections show that intergenerational transfers 
play an important role in the accumulation process. On average, received transfers 
represent a share of households’ net wealth ranging from 30 to 55 per cent, depending on 
the method applied.  
As shown in Section 2, however, these measures can be influenced by the age of 
individuals. This shortcoming can be overcome if the amount of transfers is computed in 
a lifetime perspective, a scheme which differs from the traditional approach for three 
main reasons: a) it takes into account both the transfers that households have received and 
those that households will receive in the future (or those given and those to be left); b) it 
considers the present value of transfers at a fixed age; c) it considers the amount of 
transfers as a share of lifetime resources (instead of net wealth).  
In the following, the computational tasks involved in these three steps are 
described in detail. 
Lifetime income and transfers. Using 2002 SHIW data, the computation of 
intergenerational transfers can easily be extended to transfers that households will 
receive in the future, as a specific question on expectations was asked in the 
questionnaire. Although expectations may differ from actual transfers, they can be 
considered relatively good proxies of what households will receive. 
In order to estimate the present value of inheritance to be received we resort to the 
expected residual life of the household head’s parents; similarly, the present value of 
future transfers to be left to descendants is computed using the expected residual life of 
the household head and his/her spouse. The underlying hypothesis that all future transfers 
take the form of bequests does not seem too strong because, according to survey data, 
they make up more than 80 per cent of transfers. 
As already shown in Section 2, the present value of transfers depends on the 
difference between the household head’s age and his/her age at the time when the 
transfers occurred. Equal transfers received at different times and ages of the household 
head have different values that depend on capitalised returns.  
To control for such heterogeneity, we compute the present value of transfers, past 
and future, at a fixed age of 15 years. The rate of return is fixed at 2 per cent. 
The computation of lifetime income, in order to obtain household lifetime 
resources, is a demanding task. While the year at which the employed persons started to 
work is known from the survey, information on periods of unemployment in the past is 
unknown; in addition, the year of death of individuals is unknown, although its average 
value can be estimated on the basis of demographic information. In generals difficulties 
arise because SHIW data provide a picture of household income in a single year only, 
while longitudinal data over the life span would be required.  
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Lifetime income is obtained summing the income from labour or pensions (Yt) 
estimated at each age of the household head. At any age, income (in log) is made up of 
three components:  
log Yt = Xβ + f (age) + ut  where ut = ρut-1 + et and et is N.i.i.d. 
The first component (Xβ, where β is a vector of parameters to be estimated) 
accounts for the invariant characteristics (X) of individuals (i.e. sex, education, 
geographical area); the second component (f(age)) is a quadratic function of age; the third 
is a residual, which is assumed to follow a first order autoregressive process. The 
parameter ρ has been estimated by resorting to the panel sample 1998-2002 (which 
provides an estimated coefficient close to 0.9).10  
  Intergenerational transfers of lifetime resources. The ratio of transfers received 
over the whole life span to the total amount of resources, both discounted at the age of 
15, is on average equal to 4.6 per cent, a significant share considering the large size of 
the denominator (Table A3).  
The age profile of both received and expected intergenerational transfers is much 
flatter than that observed for received transfers at a given age (Figure 4); the younger 
generations, however, maintain the worst conditions in terms of received transfers. 
Although this result could depend on the underestimation of the value of inheritances, 
which for young people may appear far in the future, it is also possible that it reveals 
negative expectations of the young.  
 
Figure 4 
Received transfers by age, 2002 
(index 100 = all ages) 
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Source: Our calculations based on data from the SHIW. Transfers include the capitalisation of interest. 
                                                          
10  The correlation coefficient ρ has been estimated taking into account the measurement errors in income data, as 
estimated by Biancotti, D’Alessio and Neri (2004). 
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5. Intergenerational transfers: distribution and correlation with other variables  
In this section we look at the distribution of transfers, their concentration and their 
correlation with other variables, in order to provide the reader with useful information to 
assess the impact of intergenerational transfers on inequality.  
This assessment is very complex and in many respects is a value judgment, because 
people differ in their views on inequality. 
Some people argue that inequality does not change when all resources are 
increased in the same proportion (the relative criterion); others argue that inequality does 
not change when an equal amount is added to all previous resources (the absolute 
criterion). As Atkinson and Brandolini (2005) write, there is no a priori reason to rank 
one criterion over the other.  
Table 4 
Distribution of transfers among the population 
 Transfers 
Capitalised transfers  
(2% yearly) 
Lifetime transfers 
(discounted at 15 years) 
 Given Received Given Received Given and planned 
Received 
and 
expected 
Household deciles..........       
Up to 1st decile ............. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
From 1st to 2nd decile .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
From 2nd to 3rd decile .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
From 3rd to 4th decile .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 
From 4th to 5th decile ... 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 0.0 
From 5th to 6th decile ... 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.2 0.0 
From 6th to 7th decile ... 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.3 8.7 2.1 
From 7th to 8th decile ... 0.0 5.4 0.0 4.6 12.4 7.5 
From 8th to 9th decile ... 0.0 15.4 0.0 13.5 17.9 16.8 
Over the 9th decile ........ 100.0 78.8 100 81.6 49.0 73.5 
       
Top 5 per cent................ 100.0 63.8 100.0 67.1 34.8 57.9 
Top 1 per cent................ 73.6 32.3 75.1 36.1 16.2 28.3 
Top 0.5 per cent............. 54.2 18.0 55.6 22.7 11.1 16.3 
       
Gini index ..................... 0.987 0.887 0.988 0.898 0.671 0.860 
Source: Our calculations based on data from the SHIW.  
People looking at the space of opportunities or at the different nature of transfers 
and earned wealth will have different views on the impact of transfers on inequality than 
people looking at the space of disposable resources. Some people will have little doubt 
that intergenerational transfers represent a clear source of inequality of opportunity, 
because they provide individuals with different resources at the beginning of their life; 
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others will think that transfers are not the result of individuals’ merits and efforts while 
income has to be earned, and therefore it would be preferable to use some welfare 
function instead of to look at the distribution of wealth; others will think that what matters 
is (present and future) consumption and therefore it is the total amount of resources to be 
considered and not their origins. Having in mind these different views, the aim of this 
section is not to assess the impact of transfers on inequality but to provide readers with 
information useful to make their own judgment. 
Transfers are extremely concentrated: the Gini index of received transfers is 0.89 
while that of given transfers is 0.99 (Table 4). 
As already mentioned, the amount of transfers, received and given, increases with 
age, introducing a spurious effect in the analysis of its distribution among population.11 It 
is not surprising that lifetime transfers are less concentrated than the corresponding 
phenomena described so far; the Gini index of the transfers received and expected is 0.86 
(compared with 0.89 for the transfers received until the moment of the interview); that of 
the transfers given or planned for the descendents is 0.67 (compared with 0.99).  
Although reduced, the lifetime transfers appear also highly concentrated when 
compared with family income or net wealth (the Gini index is 0.36 and 0.62 respectively) 
or lifetime income and consumption (both 0.38). The top 5 per cent of households receive 
more than half of all the transfers while the top 10 per cent receive approximately three 
quarters; on the other hand, the top 10 per cent of households have transferred or have 
planned to transfer approximately half of all the transfers.  
Households receiving transfers show higher levels of lifetime income, 
consumption, net wealth and given transfers than non-recipient households (Table 5). 
Computed on the recipients, which represent approximately 40 per cent of the population, 
the ratio of transfers received over the whole life span to the total amount of resources is 
on average 9.4 per cent. For the top 10 per cent of households with the highest received 
transfers, the ratio of transfers to total lifetime resources is equal to 22 per cent. 
The gap in terms of lifetime income between those who receive transfers and those 
who do not, is equal to 25.7 per cent; it becomes 38.8 per cent in terms of lifetime 
resources. Households belonging to the top 10 per cent of the distribution of transfers 
have a lifetime income approximately 40 per cent higher than those who do not receive 
transfers; the gap becomes 80 per cent after the transfers are taken into account.  
In terms of lifetime consumption the gap between the households receiving 
transfers and the others is narrower than that observed for lifetime resources (36.4 
compared with 38.8 per cent) as the former households transfer a higher absolute amount 
of their lifetime resources to their descendants.  
The correlation between the capitalised received transfers (until the date of the 
interview) and net wealth is positive and equal to 0.39; on the contrary, the correlation 
between transfers and life-cycle wealth is negative (-0.72). 
The coefficient of variation of net wealth is lower than that of life-cycle wealth 
(computed as the difference between net wealth and transfers). Richer households receive 
higher transfers but, as a proportion of their current wealth holdings, transfers are greater 
for poor households than rich ones (Table A5). 
                                                          
11  For this reasons in this paragraph we concentrate the analysis on the variables referring to the whole life span (and 
discounted at the age of 15), unless clearly specified otherwise. 
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Table 5 
Lifetime transfers and resources of descendants  
by educational qualification of fathers  
 Share of population 
Received 
capitalised 
transfers 
Lifetime 
income 
Lifetime 
resources 
Lifetime 
consumption 
Given 
capitalised 
transfers 
 (percent) Average amount (discounted at 15 years old) 
Educational qualification of the father of the household head (1) 
None .......................  28.1 23,330 669,442 671,727 650,682 21,045 
Elementary school ..  46.8 49,481 1,130,139 1,134,588 1,089,555 45,032 
Middle school .........  13.8 48,645 1,450,890 1,464,713 1,429,891 34,822 
High school ............  7.1 127,922 1,501,860 1,562,701 1,495,620 67,081 
University degree ...  3.2 188,058 1,519,398 1,651,602 1,595,748 55,854 
       
Received transfers       
Non-receiving 
Households..............  
58.9 0 900,573 900,573 877,212 23,361 
Total receiving ........  41.1 117,25 1,132,326 1,249,576 1,196,364 53,211 
  of which top 10% ..  10.0 353,374 1,262,846 1,616,220 1,514,472 101,749 
Total ............................  100.0 48,202 995,848 1,044,050 1,008,417 35,633 
  Share of lifetime resources (percentages) 
Educational qualification of the father of the household head (1) 
None .......................  - 3.5 99.7 100.0 96.9 3.1 
Elementary school ..  - 4.4 99.6 100.0 96.0 4.0 
Middle school .........  - 3.3 99.1 100.0 97.6 2.4 
High school ............  - 8.2 96.1 100.0 95.7 4.3 
University degree ...  - 11.4 92.0 100.0 96.6 3.4 
       
Received transfers       
Non-receiving 
Households..............  
- 0.0 100.0 100.0 97.4 2.6 
Total receiving ........  - 9.4 90.6 100.0 95.7 4.3 
  of which top 10% ..  - 21.9 78.1 100.0 93.7 6.3 
Total ............................  - 4.6 95.4 100.0 96.6 3.4 
Source: Our calculations based on data from the SHIW.  
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Table 6 
Correlation coefficients among  
transfers, income, consumption and wealth  
 Transfers received 
Transfers 
given 
Transfers 
to be 
received 
Transfers 
to be 
given 
Net 
wealth Income 
Con-
sumption 
Life- 
cycle 
wealth 
Transfers received. 1.00        
Transfers given .... 0.19 1.00       
Transfers to be 
received................. 0.02 0.01 1.00      
Transfers to be 
given ..................... 0.24 0.06 0.19 1.00     
Net wealth ............ 0.39 0.07 0.11 0.55 1.00    
Income .................. 0.23 0.05 0.15 0.41 0.58 1.00   
Consumption ........ 0.23 0.03 0.14 0.34 0.50 0.73 1.00  
Life cycle wealth .. -0.72 0.01 0.06 0.16 0.34 0.20 0.13 1.00 
Source: Our calculations based on data from the SHIW. Transfers include the capitalisation of interest. 
Table 7 
Correlation coefficients among  
lifetime transfers, income, consumption and resources  
 
Transfers 
received or 
to be 
received 
Transfers 
given or to 
be given 
Lifetime 
resources 
Lifetime 
consumption 
Lifetime 
income 
Transfers received or to be 
received .......................................  1.00     
Transfers given or to be given .....  0.34 1.00    
Lifetime resources .......................  0.31 0.26 1.00   
Lifetime consumption..................  0.28 0.16 1.00 1.00  
Lifetime income ..........................  0.10 0.20 0.98 0.98 1.00 
Source: Our calculations based on data from the SHIW. Transfers include the capitalisation of interest. 
These results, very similar to those obtained by Wolff (2002), cannot be interpreted 
as an equalising effect of transfers because people tend to react to transfers, changing 
their saving and consumption behaviour.12 
Estimating life-cycle wealth as a function of transfers (received, to be received, 
given, to be given) and other explanatory variables, it turns out that households reduce 
                                                          
12  In Italy the correlation between transfers received and life-cycle wealth is -0.72 (Table 6). In the US, according to 
Wolff’s estimates, the correlation between transfers (WT) and current wealth holdings excluding transfers (NWX) 
varied over time from -0.30 in 1989 to -0.71 in 1992. In all four years the negative correlation between WT and NWX 
reduced (mechanically) overall wealth inequality. It is worth noting that, even if saving and consumption behaviour did 
not change in response to transfers, the equalising effect would not necessarily be intentional: it may be due to the 
random process of unintentional bequests. According to Gokhale and Kotlikoff (2002), in the US many, if not most, 
bequests appear to arise because the resources of the elderly are not fully annuitised; who receives inheritances is, in 
large part, a random process, which can, according to their model, equalise the distribution of wealth. On this issue see 
also De Nardi (2004) and Gokhale et al. (2001).  
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their life-cycle wealth less than the received transfers (with a coefficient close to -0.8 in 
the OLS estimate and to -0.48 in our preferred IV estimates in Table 8). Symmetrically, 
the coefficient of the given transfers is close to 1 in OLS and greater than 1 in 2SLS, 
suggesting that households increase their savings to compensate for the part of wealth 
transferred to offspring. 
Table 8 
Effects of transfers on life-cycle wealth 
Variable (1) 
Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
error 
t-value Prob. 
OLS (Adjusted R squared=0.43)     
Received transfers ............................................ -0.80338 0.02188 -36.73 <.0001 
Transfers to be received ................................... -0.15523 0.05896 -2.63 0.0085 
Given transfers .................................................. 0.90778 0.07293 12.45 <.0001 
Transfers to be given ........................................ 0.96351 0.02669 36.09 <.0001 
     
2SLS (2) (Adjusted R squared=0.24)     
Received transfers ............................................ -0.83633 0.062893 -13.30 <.0001 
Transfers to be received ................................... -0.24773 0.141973 -1.74 0.0811 
Given transfers ................................................. 2.290186 1.055186 2.17 0.0300 
Transfers to be given ........................................ 1.196099 0.387602 3.09 0.0020 
     
2SLS (3) (Adjusted R squared=0.07)     
Received transfers ............................................ -0.48650 0.175584 -2.77 0.0056 
Transfers to be received ................................... 0.824985 0.676886 1.22 0.2230 
Given transfers ................................................. 1.711696 0.881536 1.94 0.0522 
Transfers to be given ........................................ 0.702330 0.285305 2.46 0.0139 
Dependent variable: ratio of life cycle wealth to household income. Other explanatory variables: intercept, 
1/(household income), geographical areas (2 dummies), municipality size (3 dummies), sex, age, age 
squared, household head’s education (4 dummies), number of family members, number of income receivers, 
ratio of precautionary saving to income. 
 (1) Transfers include the capitalisation of interest and are divided by family income. (2) Transfers given and 
to be given are considered endogenous variables. Education, sector of activity and professional status of the 
household head’s father are used as instrumental variables. (3) Transfers given and to be given are 
considered endogenous variables; transfers received and to be received are considered affected by 
measurement error. Therefore, all transfers are instrumented, resorting to education, sector of activity and 
professional status of the household head’s father as instrumental variables.  
Source: Our calculations based on data from the SHIW.  
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Figure 5 
Received and given lifetime transfers (1) 
5
7
9
11
13
15
5 7 9 11 13 15
Received transfers (log)
G
iv
en
 tr
an
sf
er
s (
lo
g)
 
Source: Our calculations based on data from the SHIW. – (1) Transfers include the capitalisation of interest. 
The transfers that households plan to leave to their descendants also present 
coefficients close to 1, suggesting that transfers to be given bring about higher saving. On 
the contrary, the transfers that households expect to receive have a small (and/or not 
significant) impact on saving, suggesting that households tend to adjust their saving 
behaviour only after they have received a transfer and not before; this result is very 
similar to that obtained by Brown and Weisbenner (2002).  
In a lifetime perspective, the correlation between received and given transfers is 
positive (the correlation coefficient is equal to 0.33); it remains approximately the same 
when controlling for lifetime income (the partial correlation coefficient is equal to 0.32). 
A positive relationship between planned bequests and received inheritance holds up 
even after controlling for lifetime resources. Figure 6 shows the amount of lifetime 
transfers that households have given or planned to give to their offspring by percentiles of 
lifetime resources and three classes of received (or expected to receive) transfers (zero, 
greater than zero and lower than the median, greater than the median). The figure 
suggests that the stronger intent to bequeath among inheritors is not merely a 
manifestation of wealth. Similar results obtain looking at the percentage of households 
who expect to leave a greater-than-the-median bequest (Figure 7). These results are very 
similar to those of Cox and Stark (2005), who find a large, significant, and robust effect 
of (received) inheritances on intended bequests, probably due to the importance of family 
traditions. 
The increase in given transfers is less than proportional to the increase in received 
transfers (Figure 5). The ratio of given to received transfers is greater when received 
transfers are small and lower when transfers are large.  
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Figure 6 
Given transfers by percentiles of lifetime resources 
and classes of received transfers (*) 
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(*) Transfers include the capitalisation of interest. HRT= Received transfers greater than the 
median; LRT = Received transfers greater than zero and lower than the median; 0RT = Received 
transfers equal to zero.  
Source: Our calculations based on data from the SHIW.  
Figure 7 
Probability that given transfers are greater than the median of positive given 
transfers, by percentiles of lifetime resources and classes of received transfers (*) 
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(*) Transfers include the capitalisation of interest. H-P(TG>median) = Received transfers greater 
than the median; L-P(TG>median) = Received transfers greater than zero and lower than the 
median; 0-P(TG>median) = Received transfers equal to zero. 
Source: Our calculations based on data from the SHIW.  
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The correlation between transfers (received or expected over the whole life span) 
and lifetime income is positive. Richer households do receive greater inheritances and 
other wealth transfers than poorer households (Table A4). However, as a proportion of 
their lifetime income, transfers are greater for poorer households than richer ones. A 
similar result obtains for transfers to be left to future generations: richer households give 
to their siblings greater transfers than poorer households, but as a proportion of the 
resources, transfers are greater for poorer donors. Again, these results do not imply an 
equalising impact of transfers on lifetime resources. 
In fact, these results could be due to several factors.  
1) Households receiving transfers may make less effort to produce income; in this 
case there would be a negative correlation between received transfers and income; 
the decrease in inequality of lifetime resources would be attributable to the change 
in the behaviour of recipients. 
2) Parents may plan the amount of transfers to bequeath on the basis of children 
earning ability; thus low-income children could receive more transfers than high-
income children. In addition, parents may decide to leave financial transfers to 
children with fewer abilities, while investing in the education of children with 
greater potential. In both cases the ratio of received transfers to income will 
decrease as children’s income increases. The decrease in inequality would be 
intentionally due to the behaviour of parents.  
3) Richer parents may invest more than poorer parents in children’s education and 
provide their offspring with greater earning opportunity; for these children the ratio 
of received transfers to income will be low because they will have a greater 
probability of getting well paid jobs. 
4) The decrease in inequality of lifetime resources could be due to the random process 
of unintentional bequests. 
We do not find a significant effect of received transfers on income. When 
estimating (log) of household head’s and spouse’s current income from labour or 
pensions as a function of (received and expected) transfers and other household 
characteristics, the coefficient of transfers is negative (as expected) but not significant; 
results do not change when transfers are interacted with the dummy spouse, or when we 
consider only greater-than-median transfers and their interaction with the dummy spouse 
(Table 9). 
Similar results obtain when estimating lifetime income as a function of (received 
and given over the life span) transfers and other control variables (age, age squared, sex, 
education, geographical area, dummy married, number of income earners and parents’ 
occupation). The coefficient reporting the effect of received transfers on income is 
negative and not significantly different from zero; the coefficient of given transfers is 
positive and significantly different from zero. Given transfers, however, cannot be 
considered an exogenous variable as they depend on lifetime resources. Resorting to IV 
estimators (using education and sector of activity of household head’s father and number 
of children as instruments) the coefficients of both transfers turn out to be highly non-
significant (these results are not reported). In other words, while received transfers lead to 
an increase in consumption and given transfers to a decrease in consumption, their  
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influence on income turns out to be small.13 
Table 9 
The effects of transfers on family income 
Variable (1) 
Parameter 
estimate 
Standard error t-value Prob. 
Transfers (received and expected).... -7,34733E-9 2,094389E-8 -0,35 0,7258 
Transfers (received and expected)* 
dummy spouse ................................. -4,0734E-10 3,041089E-8 -0,01 0,9893 
Transfers (received and expected) 
greater than the median .................... -5,91843E-9 2,084285E-8 -0,28 0,7765 
Transfers (received and expected) 
[greater than the median]*dummy 
spouse............................................... 6,01977E-10 3,018176E-8 0,02 0,9841 
Dependent variable: log of household head’s and spouse’s income from labour or pensions. Other 
explanatory variables: intercept, municipality size (3 dummies), geographical area (2 dummies), sex, age, 
age squared, education (4 dummies), father’s education (5 dummies), spouse (1 dummy). Adjusted R 
squared=0.41; RMSE=0.525; Dependent mean=9.62. 
Source: Our calculations based on data from the SHIW.  (1) Transfers include the capitalisation of interest. 
The measurement of the importance of the role of the other factors is beyond the 
aim of this paper; some consideration, however, seem proper. Type 2 factors tend to 
increase the resources of worse-off households; to some extent this kind of bequest can 
therefore be equalising. Type 3 factors tend to hide the importance of the mechanisms of 
transmission of inequality, when looking at financial transfers only. In fact, financial 
transfers are just one of the channels of transmission of inequality and probably not the 
most important. Parents transfer not only wealth, but also education, ability and 
opportunities; these factors influence lifetime resources more than bequests and inter 
vivos transfers.14 
Lifetime received transfers account for 8.6 per cent of the variance of lifetime 
resources; received transfers and family background variables (i.e. father’s education 
dummies) account for 21.6 per cent of the variance. With the increase in the education of 
parents, the increase in lifetime resources of children is much greater (in absolute terms) 
than the increase in received transfers (Table 5). Family background variables play a 
much more important role than bequests as a factor of transmission of inequality of 
                                                          
13  The small effect of inheritance on income seems to be consistent with previous studies examining the effect of 
inheritance on labour supply. Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) find that inheritance does not lead to a large reduction in 
the labour supply of men and married women; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1993) find small reductions in the 
labour supply of inheritors who remain in the labour force (but the likelihood that a person decreases his or her 
participation in the labour force increases with the size of the inheritance received). Looking at old-age support in 
developing countries, Cameron and Cobb-Clark (2001) find little evidence that transfers are a substitute for the income 
support provided by the elderly parent’s own labour supply. The findings of Brown, Coile and Weisbenner (2006), 
however, contrast with those of the previous literature, which failed to find large and consistent effects of inheritance 
receipt on retirement; in addition, they find that the effect on retirement is larger when the inheritance is unexpected. 
14  See, for instance, Bowles and Gintis (2002). Gokhale and Kotlikoff (2002, p. 269) argue that “While bequests are 
important, the main determinant of wealth inequality, according to our model, is earning inequality”. 
Intergenerational transfers in Italy 
 
 
277
lifetime resources. In other words, the main determinant of inequality of lifetime 
resources is earning inequality, significantly influenced by family background variables. 
Intergenerational (financial) transfers play a more limited role in generating inequality of 
lifetime resources; in some circumstances, intergenerational (financial) transfers can also 
reduce the inequality of resources (for instance, when they are unintentional and follow a 
random process15 or when they are made to children with relatively low earnings, or poor 
saving discipline16).  
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have examined the role of intergenerational transfers in the wealth 
accumulation of Italian households. The traditional measures employed in Section 3 show 
that received transfers represent an important share of the net wealth held by households. 
Direct estimates referring to 2002 range from 30 to 55 per cent, depending on the 
inclusion of the income stream produced by transferred assets. This share has shown a 
tendency to increase over the last decade.  
In a lifetime perspective, the ratio of transfers received over the whole life span to 
the total amount of resources, both computed at the age of 15, is on average equal to 4.6 
per cent, a significant share considering the size of the denominator. Computed on the 
recipients, the same ratio is 9.4 per cent. The lifetime perspective allows a deeper analysis 
of the age profile of inheritance; while received transfers at the observed age appears 
positively correlated with age, in particular when the return on capital is taken into 
account, the amount of inheritance received over the life span is much flatter. Looking at 
intergenerational transfers received (or given) until a given age can lead to an 
overestimation of the role of transfers as a factor of inequality. Transfers, however, are 
very concentrated, more than income and wealth, even when considered in a lifetime 
perspective. 
Households receiving transfers show higher levels of lifetime income, 
consumption, net wealth and given transfers than non-recipient households. Richer 
households receive larger transfers but, as a proportion of their current wealth holdings, 
transfers are greater for poorer households than richer ones. These results cannot be 
interpreted as an equalising effect of transfers, because people tend to react to transfers, 
changing their saving and consumption behaviour. 
The correlation between transfers (received or expected over the whole life span) 
and lifetime income is positive. Again, richer households receive greater inheritances and 
other wealth transfers than poorer households; as a proportion of their lifetime income, 
transfers are greater for poorer households than richer ones. This result is likely to be due 
to the much more important role played by family background variables than bequests as 
factors of transmission of inequality of lifetime resources. 
Finally, we find a positive relationship between left-to-children bequests and 
received-from-parents inheritances; this relationship holds even after controlling for 
lifetime resources, suggesting the importance of the role of family traditions.  
 
                                                          
15  See, for instance, De Nardi (2004) and Gokhale et al. (2001). 
16  See, for instance, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (2002). 
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APPENDIX A 
STATISTICAL TABLES 
Table A1 
Intergenerational transfers by age of household head 
(percentages of households, euros) 
Age (years) 
Share of 
households that 
have received 
transfers 
Share of 
households that 
have given 
transfers 
Share of 
households that 
expect to receive 
transfers 
Share of 
households that 
expect to give 
transfers 
up to 30 .................................... 17.9 0.0 27.7 51.9 
31-40 ........................................ 28.7 0.4 26.7 59.0 
41-50 ........................................ 33.1 0.3 19.2 60.6 
51-60 ........................................ 43.5 3.1 11.3 64.5 
61-70 ........................................ 36.1 5.6 3.7 58.1 
over 71 ..................................... 31.2 9.0 1.0 53.0 
Total ......................................... 33.8 3.6 12.6 58.6 
 average amounts 
 Received  Given  To be received  To be given  
up to 30 .................................... 14,923 0 27,071 61,480 
31-40 ........................................ 36,236 192 36,134 110,040 
41-50 ........................................ 49,958 71 29,231 135,971 
51-60 ........................................ 77,824 1,489 11,875 184,724 
61-70 ........................................ 80,141 5,708 4,128 135,897 
over 71 ...................................... 66,479 10,041 280 98,480 
Total ......................................... 60,422 3,522 16,262 129,436 
 average amounts (capitalised or discounted) 
 Received  Given  To be received  To be given  
up to 30 .................................... 16,999 0 17,240 21,027 
31-40 ........................................ 43,679 201 26,206 46,059 
41-50 ........................................ 70,572 85 22,937 67,120 
51-60 ........................................ 115,368 1,629 10,186 108,330 
61-70 ........................................ 138,966 7,340 3,617 93,846 
over 71 ...................................... 136,350 13,965 261 80,424 
Total ......................................... 98,706 4,690 12,459 77,012 
 average amounts (discounted at 15 years) 
 Received  Given  To be received  To be given  
up to 30 .................................... 13,359 0 13,819 16,978 
31-40 ........................................ 28,656 128 17,530 30,163 
41-50 ........................................ 38,896 44 12,916 36,958 
51-60 ........................................ 52,335 723 4,684 49,402 
61-70 ........................................ 52,160 2,760 1,421 35,279 
over 71 ...................................... 38,161 3,848 84 23,746 
Total ......................................... 40,855 1,497 7,347 34,135 
Source: Our calculations based on data from the 2002 SHIW. 
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Table A2 
Wealth and transfers by age of household head 
(euros, percentages) 
Age (years) 
Life-cycle 
wealth 
Future net 
dissaving Net wealth 
Ratio of life-
cycle wealth 
to net wealth 
Ratio of future 
net dissaving 
to net wealth 
up to 30 ..................... 52,478 65,690 69,477 75,5 94,5 
31-40 ........................ 91,031 114,655 134,509 67,7 85,2 
41-50 ........................ 102,506 128,810 172,993 59,3 74,5 
51-60 ........................ 132,315 147,909 246,054 53,8 60,1 
61-70 ........................ 77,002 118,400 208,628 36,9 56,8 
over 71....................... 38,604 80,827 160,989 24,0 50,2 
Total ......................... 85,632 115,095 179,649 47,7 64,1 
Source: Our calculations based on data from the 2002 SHIW. Transfers include the capitalisation of interest. 
Table A3 
Lifetime resources, consumption, income and transfers by age of household head 
(values discounted at the age of 15 years, euros) 
Age (years) 
Lifetime 
received 
transfers (1) 
(a) 
Lifetime 
given 
transfers (1) 
  
(b) 
Lifetime 
income (2) 
 
(c) 
Lifetime 
resources  
(a) + (c) 
Lifetime 
consumption 
(a)+(c)–(b)  
up to 30 ............................ 27,178 16,978  1,518,864  1,546,041  1,529,063 
31-40 ............................... 46,186 30,291  1,518,259  1,564,445  1,534,154 
41-50 ............................... 51,812 37,002  1,324,082  1,375,894  1,338,892 
51-60 ............................... 57,019 50,126  996,785  1,053,804  1,003,678 
61-70 ............................... 53,581 38,040  665,493  719,074  681,034 
over 71.............................. 38,245 27,594  446,902  485,147  457,553 
Total ................................ 48,202 35,633  995,848  1,044,050  1,008,417 
 (1) With capitalisation of interest. (2) Autocorrelation coefficient of residuals = 0.9; adjusted for 
productivity growth.  
Source: Our calculations based on data from the 2002 SHIW.  
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Table A4 
Lifetime resources, consumption, income and transfers (1)  
(average values, discounted at 15 years old; euros and percentages)  
Tenths of 
households 
by lifetime 
resources 
Lifetime 
resources 
Lifetime 
consumption 
Lifetime 
income (2)
Lifetime 
received 
transfers 
Lifetime 
given 
transfers 
Ratio of 
lifetime 
income to 
lifetime 
resources 
Ratio of 
lifetime 
transfers 
received to 
lifetime 
resources 
Ratio of 
lifetime 
transfers 
given to 
lifetime 
resources 
1 238,663 228,210 233,067 5,595 10,453 97.7 2.3 4.4 
2 360,855 344,757 348,923 11,932 16,097 96.7 3.3 4.5 
3 485,506 464,918 468,387 17,119 20,588 96.5 3.5 4.2 
4 629,637 605,427 601,582 28,055 24,210 95.5 4.5 3.8 
5 765,142 735,907 743,122 22,020 29,235 97.1 2.9 3.8 
6 926,384 892,410 889,762 36,622 33,974 96.0 4.0 3.7 
7 1,124,531 1,083,812 1,083,689 40,842 40,719 96.4 3.6 3.6 
8 1,385,889 1,336,344 1,327,063 58,826 49,545 95.8 4.2 3.6 
9 1,798,367 1,742,984 1,708,662 89,706 55,384 95.0 5.0 3.1 
10 2,732,596 2,656,275 2,560,818 171,777 76,320 93.7 6.3 2.8 
Total .......... 1,044,050 1,008,417 995,848 48,202 35,633 95.4 4.6 3.4 
Tenths of 
households 
by lifetime 
consumption 
Lifetime 
resources 
Lifetime 
consumption 
Lifetime 
income (2)
Lifetime 
received 
transfers 
Lifetime 
given 
transfers 
Ratio of 
lifetime 
income to 
lifetime 
consumption
Ratio of 
lifetime 
transfers 
received to 
lifetime 
consumption 
Ratio of 
lifetime 
transfers 
given to 
lifetime 
consumption 
1 253,254 220,246 244,081 9,172 33,007 110.8 4.2 15.0 
2 359,160 340,998 345,376 13,784 18,162 101.3 4.0   5.3 
3 482,588 463,361 465,344 17,244 19,227 100.4 3.7   4.1 
4 627,878 601,875 604,920 22,958 26,003 100.5 3.8   4.3 
5 763,240 739,162 736,974 26,266 24,078   99.7 3.6   3.3 
6 928,350 891,931 882,844 45,506 36,419   99.0 5.1   4.1 
7 1,123,324 1,083,818 1,083,643 39,681 39,506 100.0 3.7   3.6 
8 1,386,150 1,345,624 1,334,552 51,599 40,527   99.2 3.8   3.0 
9 1,797,681 1,737,021 1,687,848 109,834 60,660   97.2 6.3   3.5 
10 2,725,236 2,666,392 2,578,733 146,504 58,844   96.7 5.5   2.2 
Total .......... 1,044,050 1,008,417 995,848 48,202 35,633   98.8 4.8   3.5 
Tenths of 
households 
by lifetime 
income 
Lifetime 
resources 
Lifetime 
consumption 
Lifetime 
income (2)
Lifetime 
received 
transfers 
Lifetime 
given 
transfers 
Ratio of 
lifetime 
income to 
lifetime 
resources 
Ratio of 
lifetime 
transfers 
received to 
lifetime 
income 
Ratio of 
lifetime 
transfers 
given to 
lifetime 
income 
1 258,356 242,586 229,625 28,730 15,770 88.9 12.5 6.9 
2 364,680 347,254 340,943 23,737 17,426 93.5  7.0 5.1 
3 497,014 474,384 462,208 34,806 22,631 93.0  7.5 4.9 
4 650,522 626,033 603,041 47,481 24,488 92.7  7.9 4.1 
5 779,979 744,095 729,368 50,610 35,884 93.5  6.9 4.9 
6 939,560 902,117 880,028 59,531 37,442 93.7  6.8 4.3 
7 1,112,481 1,073,667 1,068,468 44,013 38,814 96.0  4.1 3.6 
8 1,380,374 1,332,965 1,323,046 57,328 47,409 95.8  4.3 3.6 
9 1,755,853 1,705,857 1,708,829 47,024 49,996 97.3  2.8 2.9 
10 2,710,284 2,643,689 2,621,419 88,865 66,595 96.7  3.4 2.5 
Total .......... 1,044,050 1,008,417 995,848 48,202 35,633 95.4  4.8 3.6 
 (1) Transfers include the capitalisation of interest. (2) Lifetime income is adjusted for productivity 
growth; autocorrelation coefficient of residuals = 0.9.  
Source: Our calculations based on data from the 2002 SHIW. 
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Table A5 
Wealth and transfers (1)  
(average values; euros and percentages)  
Tenths of 
house-
holds by 
net 
wealth 
Wealth Lifecycle wealth 
Future 
dissaving  
Received 
transfers 
Given 
transfers 
Transfers 
to be 
received 
Transfers 
to be 
given 
Ratio of 
received 
transfers 
to net 
wealth 
Ratio of 
given 
transfers 
to net 
wealth 
Ratio of 
transfers 
to be 
received 
to net 
wealth 
Ratio of 
transfers 
to be 
given to 
net 
wealth 
1 -1,016 -396 -3,732 1,654 2,274 6,884 9,600 -162.8 -223.8 -677.6 -944.9
2 5,033 5,944 2,239 3,266 4,177 7,453 10,247 64.9 83.0 148.1 203.6
3 20,441 2,736 9,797 23,991 6,286 6,618 17,262 117.4 30.8 32.4 84.4
4 55,760 11,309 33,413 45,290 838 7,869 30,216 81.2 1.5 14.1 54.2
5 89,643 46,322 54,795 44,300 979 4,180 39,028 49.4 1.1 4.7 43.5
6 120,100 65,053 70,199 56,207 1,161 7,958 57,858 46.8 1.0 6.6 48.2
7 162,171 71,126 100,617 94,424 3,379 9,703 71,257 58.2 2.1 6.0 43.9
8 218,245 134,656 137,088 86,076 2,487 16,122 97,278 39.4 1.1 7.4 44.6
9 314,428 165,555 205,228 151,412 2,539 20,670 129,870 48.2 0.8 6.6 41.3
10 813,789 355,134 542,806 481,562 22,907 37,261 308,244 59.2 2.8 4.6 37.9
Total ..... 179,649 85,632 115,095 98,706 4,690 12,459 77,012 54.9 2.6 6.9 42.9
Tenths of 
house-
holds by 
lifecycle 
wealth 
Wealth Lifecycle wealth 
Future 
dissaving  
Received 
transfers 
Given 
transfers 
Transfers 
to be 
received 
Transfers 
to be 
given 
Ratio of 
received 
transfers 
to 
lifecycle 
wealth 
Ratio of 
given 
transfers 
to 
lifecycle 
wealth 
Ratio of 
transfers 
to be 
received 
to 
lifecycle 
wealth 
Ratio of 
transfers 
to be 
given to 
lifecycle 
wealth 
1 236,845 -420,401 138,911 666,057 8,810 8,765 106,699 -158.4 -2.1 -2.1 -25.4
2 30,743 -6,460 17,486 37,620 417 6,965 20,222 -582.4 -6.5 -107.8 -313.0
3 13,446 2,679 6,888 10,855 88 4,544 11,102 405.2 3.3 169.6 414.4
4 27,873 11,966 15,589 15,977 71 7,764 20,048 133.5 0.6 64.9 167.5
5 72,138 43,406 41,216 29,429 697 4,897 35,818 67.8 1.6 11.3 82.5
6 104,025 81,578 68,526 23,397 950 11,876 47,375 28.7 1.2 14.6 58.1
7 138,041 116,798 79,220 22,839 1,596 8,081 66,901 19.6 1.4 6.9 57.3
8 189,582 168,617 124,580 23,097 2,132 11,694 76,695 13.7 1.3 6.9 45.5
9 282,624 249,780 176,204 43,763 10,919 26,733 133,153 17.5 4.4 10.7 53.3
10 700,789 611,295 482,212 110,737 21,243 33,046 251,623 18.1 3.5 5.4 41.2
Total ..... 179,649 85,632 115,095 98,706 4,690 12,459 77,012 115.3 5.5 14.5 89.9
Tenths of 
house-
holds by 
future 
dissaving 
Wealth Lifecycle wealth 
Future 
dissaving  
Received 
transfers 
Given 
transfers 
Transfers 
to be 
received 
Transfers 
to be 
given 
Ratio of 
received 
transfers 
to future 
dissaving 
Ratio of 
given 
transfers 
to future 
dissaving  
Ratio of 
transfers 
to be 
received 
to future 
dissaving  
Ratio of 
transfers 
to be 
given to 
future 
dissaving 
1 43,642 17,898 -60,855 28,811 3,068 1,921 106,417 -47.3 -5.0 -3.2 -174.9
2 11,080 2,127 49 12,245 3,292 114 11,145 … … … …
3 29,872 17,484 8,048 15,719 3,331 805 22,628 195.3 41.4 10.0 281.2
4 65,973 -8,996 22,240 79,687 4,718 3,425 47,158 358.3 21.2 15.4 212.0
5 94,475 35,260 43,073 61,699 2,483 5,084 56,487 143.2 5.8 11.8 131.1
6 116,448 74,296 68,299 45,524 3,371 7,143 55,293 66.7 4.9 10.5 81.0
7 174,559 104,320 99,947 72,693 2,454 8,952 83,563 72.7 2.5 9.0 83.6
8 220,356 96,884 144,460 124,797 1,325 10,750 86,645 86.4 0.9 7.4 60.0
9 289,275 148,484 214,634 151,980 11,189 23,060 97,701 70.8 5.2 10.7 45.5
10 754,438 370,465 614,023 395,638 11,664 63,616 204,032 64.4 1.9 10.4 33.2
Total ..... 179,649 85,632 115,095 98,706 4,690 12,459 77,012 85.8 4.1 10.8 66.9
Source: Our calculations based on data from the 2002 SHIW.  (1) Transfers include the capitalisation of interest. 
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APPENDIX B 
SECTION EXTRACTED FROM 2002 SHIW QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS – 2nd ROUND 
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD’S YEAR OF BIRTH IS ODD |__|__|__|__| 
1.  Have you (and your spouse) ever received a bequest or a gift or valuable presents? 
- Yes................................................................   1  
- No..................................................................  2Î Quest. 3 
 
2. Think of all the transfers of assets that you (or your spouse/cohabitant) have received as a 
bequest or gift and answer the following questions: 
B
eq
ue
st
 
G
ift
 
To the 
head of 
household 
or his/her 
spouse/ 
cohabitant 
From parents 
(or 
grandparents) 
or other 
persons? 
 
Year of the 
transfer 
 
Value of the transfer in 
the year it was made 
€  
or Value of the transfer 
€  
in ……. 
(year) 
 
1 2 HH 1 
SP 
2 
PA-
GR 1 
OTHER 
2 
|__|__|__|__|  __|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__| |__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__|Î |__|__|__|__|
1 2 HH 1 
SP 
2 
PA-
GR 1 
OTHER 
2 
|__|__|__|__| |__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__| |__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__|Î |__|__|__|__|
1 2 HH 1 
SP 
2 
PA-
GR 1 
OTHER 
2 
|__|__|__|__| |__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__| |__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__|Î |__|__|__|__|
1 2 HH 1 
SP 
2 
PA-
GR 1 
OTHER 
2 
|__|__|__|__| |__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__| |__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__|Î |__|__|__|__|
1 2 HH 1 
SP 
2 
PA-
GR 1 
OTHER 
2 
|__|__|__|__| |__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__| |__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__|Î |__|__|__|__|
 
3.  Have you (or your spouse/cohabitant) ever given or bequeathed large sums of money, 
houses, securities or other assets to your children, grandchildren or other persons?  
- Yes................................................................   1  
- No..................................................................  2Î Quest. 5 
 
4.  Think of all the transfers of assets that you (or your spouse/cohabitant) have made and 
answer the following questions: 
B
eq
ue
st
 
G
ift
 
By the 
head of 
household 
or his/her 
spouse/ 
cohabitant 
To children (or 
grandchildren) 
or other 
persons? 
 
Year of 
transfer 
 
Value of the transfer in 
the year it was made 
€ 
or Value of the transfer  
€  
in …… 
(year) 
 
1 2 HH 1 
SP 
2 
CH-
GC 1 
OTHER 
2 
|__|__|__|__| |__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__| |__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__|Î |__|__|__|__|
1 2 HH 1 
SP 
2 
CH-
GC 1 
OTHER 
2 
|__|__|__|__| |__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__| |__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__|Î |__|__|__|__|
1 2 HH 1 
SP 
2 
CH-
GC 1 
OTHER 
2 
|__|__|__|__| |__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__| |__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__|Î |__|__|__|__|
1 2 HH 1 
SP 
2 
CH-
GC 1 
OTHER 
2 
|__|__|__|__| |__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__| |__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__|Î |__|__|__|__|
1 2 HH 1 
SP 
2 
CH-
GC 1 
OTHER 
2 
|__|__|__|__| |__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__| |__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__|Î |__|__|__|__|
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5. Do you (or your spouse/cohabitant) expect to receive bequests, gifts or other valuable presents 
in the future?   
- Yes................................................................   1  
- No..................................................................  2Î Quest. 7 
 
6.  Can you specify, in particular, whether you (or your spouse/cohabitant) expect to receive something from 
your parents or grandparents or other persons?  If yes, please give an estimate of the present value of 
the assets you expect to receive. (Read the cases and enter codes and values where expected) 
 
To the head of household or 
spouse/cohabitant  
From parents (or grandparents) 
or other persons  
Present value € 
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 
1 
SPOUSE/COHABITANT 
2 
PARENTS/ 
GRANDPARENTS 
1 
OTHER 
PERSONS 
2 
|__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__|  
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 
1 
SPOUSE/COHABITANT 
2 
PARENTS/ 
GRANDPARENTS 
1 
OTHER 
PERSONS 
2 
 |__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__| 
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 
1 
SPOUSE/COHABITANT 
2 
PARENTS/ 
GRANDPARENTS 
1 
OTHER 
PERSONS 
2 
 |__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__| 
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 
1 
SPOUSE/COHABITANT 
2 
PARENTS/ 
GRANDPARENTS 
1 
OTHER 
PERSONS 
2 
 |__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__| 
 
 
7. (If aged less than 50) Do you think you will have (other) children? (If yes) How many?  
- Yes................................................................   1Î How many (more) |__| 
- No..................................................................  2 
- Don’t know ....................................................  3 
 
 
8. Considering both gifts and bequests, do you (or your spouse/cohabitant) expect to leave some 
form of wealth (financial assets, dwellings, etc.) to your existing or future children, 
grandchildren or other heirs?  
- Yes................................................................   1  
- No..................................................................  2Î Section F 
- Don’t know ....................................................  3Î Section F 
(SHOW CARD 9 2^ ROUND) 
 
9. (If yes) At today’s prices, what do you think could be the total value of your bequests, gifts and 
other valuable presents to these persons; I.e. how much will you transmit in total to your 
children and how much to other persons?  
 
To  Present value € 
CHILDREN/GRANDCHILDREN 
(existing and future) 
1 
 
OTHER PERSONS 
2 
|__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__|  
CHILDREN/GRANDCHILDREN 
(existing and future) 
1 
OTHER PERSONS 
2 
 
 
 |__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__|  
 
End of 2nd ROUND  
Î Go to Section F 
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CARD B17 
FUTURE BEQUESTS AND GIFTS  
At today’s prices, what do you think could be the total value of your bequests, 
gifts and other valuable presents to these persons; i.e. how much will you 
transmit in total to your children and how much to other persons?  
 
We are talking about your wealth (and that of your spouse/cohabitant)  
 
 Now  
 You (and your spouse/cohabitant) 
have a certain amount of wealth, i.e.: 
• Dwellings, current accounts, 
bonds, shares,… 
• …minus debts (mortgages, ...) 
= 
Net wealth 
 
 In the future  
 
 
 
your wealth could increase 
because: 
 …but your wealth could also 
decrease because: 
• You receive transfers 
(inheritances or gifts) from your 
parents (or your 
spouse/cohabitant receives 
transfers from his/her parents) 
 • You use part of your wealth 
(or increase your debts) for 
consumption or gifts (not to 
your children or grandchildren) 
 
• You keep on saving    
• You receive a lump sum from 
your employer (TFR) 
  
• You pay back your debts    
 
 
 
 … and then   
 In the end you will leave or 
bequeath to your children or 
grandchildren a total amount of 
wealth (at today’s prices) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
 
Greater than 
your present 
wealth  
 Approximately equivalent to your 
present wealth  
Lower than 
your present 
wealth 
 or about….  
 |__||__||__|.|__|__|__|.|__|__|__| €  
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